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5Introduction
With the Europe 2020 strategy, the EU wishes to become a “smart, sustain-
able and inclusive economy. These three mutually reinforcing priorities
should help the EU and the Member States deliver high levels of employ-
ment, productivity and social cohesion. Concretely, the Union has set five
ambitious objectives - on employment, innovation, education, social inclu-
sion and climate/energy - to be reached by 2020. Each Member State will
adopt its own national targets in each of these areas. Concrete actions at EU
and national levels will underpin the strategy” (Europe 2020 - Europe’s
growth strategy - European Commission).
The Europe 2020 strategy and the question of how workers’ organisations
can influence its implementation provide the key focus for the work pro-
gramme 2010-2013 of the European Centre for Workers’ Questions (EZA) and
the Research Institute for Work and Society (HIVA). An annual work pro-
gramme is prepared each year as part of the four-year work programme. The
work programme for 2012 focuses on the fifth headline target of the Europe
2020 strategy: 20 million fewer people in the EU in or at risk of poverty and
social exclusion. The focus of this research paper is on combating in-work
poverty and on ways to reduce in-work poverty risks.
6Executive summary
The increasing incidence of in-work poverty in Europe is a growing concern
for policymakers and workers’ organisations. In-work poverty needs to be
fought and prevented. Research into the causes of in-work poverty in Europe
shows that action is best focused on fighting low pay and low work intensity
at household level. 
In this fight, workers’ organisations play a central role. An overview of best
practices of workers’ organisations’ initiatives on this topic shows that there
is a multitude of strategic option.
Low pay can be fought by using collective bargaining strategies, by focusing
policy-making on minimum wages or by making companies pay decent wages
through persuasion, pressure or public procurement. 
Low work intensity can be fought by avoiding the use of atypical contracts,
by opposing further deregulation initiatives or by convincing employers not
to use atypical forms of work. Furthermore, strategies can be developed to
upgrade atypical jobs so that they provide good working conditions, a
degree of job security and good pay. Finally, workers’ organisations can also
develop strategies that enable the working poor to look for and accept more
decent jobs.
Workers’ organisations have a variety of strategies for fighting in-work
poverty. For instance, introducing (or increasing) minimum wages has a
direct impact on the income of a broad category of workers. But as in-work
poverty is not only caused by low wages, more targeted strategies that focus
on the income and wages of subgroups of the population (which are fre-
quently part of the working poor), could prove to be more efficient. Both
“living wage” campaigns and the introduction of social clauses in public pro-
curement are targeted actions, but their effectiveness is mostly limited to
public services or private companies rendering public services. The large
population of working poor who are employed in a less obvious context, are
unaffected by these strategies. Similarly, the effectiveness of the “equal
7work, equal pay” campaign is limited to those industries in which the trade
unions can influence the collective bargaining process. Campaigns like
“Justice for Janitors” and “Schoon Genoeg” on the other hand aim specifi-
cally at mobilising a group of vulnerable workers: cleaning workers. These
campaigns are, however, very intensive for workers’ organisations and their
effect is limited to those industries which are “visible” and do not face
harsh international competition.
In order to gain and mobilise public support for the workers’ organisations’
demands, a strong and consistent argumentation needs to be developed.
When reviewing the campaigns mentioned above, it is obvious that the
development and presentation of a strong economic argument is crucial. The
success of and support for the initiatives depend largely on the credibility of
the economic argument; good pay and good working conditions will no have
no negative impact on employment and the competitiveness of the firm, sec-
tor or country. Other campaigns focus rather on the social or ethical argu-
ments in calling for decent wages, and focus on gaining public support; for
instance campaigns like the “Living Wage Campaign” play the ethical card
and use research and study reports to provide a sufficient background for
their claim that a decent wage is a prerequisite for a decent living. 
Developing an economic argument is crucial for workers’ organisations wish-
ing to fight in-work poverty. In absence (or in combination with) strong
economic arguments, ethical arguments can be developed. Their effective-
ness, however, depends on the public support workers’ organisation can
mobilise for their cause. Here, local partnerships with researchers, employ-
ers, religious and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play a cen-
tral part.
Local partnerships are also essential for the organisation and mobilisation of
atypical workers in order to improve their working conditions. Here, these
partnerships provide crucial access and communication channels to reach
out to the population sections that frequently are outside the scope of trade
unions.
8Obviously, workers’ organisations have a whole range of options how to fight
in-work poverty. Moreover, past experience tells us that these campaigns can
be remarkably convincing. The agendas of both politicians and employers
can be effectively influenced and shaped by workers’ organisations’ initia-
tives. It is their decision whether they take up the challenge or not.
9PART 1
IN-WORK POVERTY IN EUROPE: A GROWING 
PHENOMENON
1 Facts and figures
This chapter starts with a description of in-work poverty and defines the dif-
ference between the working poor and low-wage workers. 
The next section presents and analyses an overview of figures showing the
evolution of in-work poverty since 2005.1
1.1 Poverty and in-work poverty: definitions
Working poor can be defined as ‘all workers who are poor’, i.e. people who
are employed but are nevertheless living in poverty. 
Who can be defined as being poor? The most commonly used indicator to
define the group of people living in poverty is “everybody whose disposable
income is below 60% of the median equivalised income (of the country)”. 
Therefore, everybody with a job who still has a disposable income beneath
that poverty threshold belongs to the working poor. The European
Commission uses this indicator to monitor in-work poverty.
What is “equivalised” income? Equivalised income is a measure of household
income that takes account of the differences in a household’s size  and com-
position (adults, younger & older children). Equivalised income is calculated
by dividing the household’s total income from all sources by its equivalent
size. 
1   A research paper commissioned by EZA on ‘The working poor and in-work poverty’ (Wets, 2010) provides us already with an extensive lit-
erature overview of the concepts and the facts and figures on working poor and in-work poverty. In this chapter we will give an update of
the facts and figures and give an overview of more recent insights.
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For instance, standard OECD calculations give a weight of 1.0 to the first
adult, a weight of 0.5 to the second adult and each subsequent person aged
14 and over, and 0.3 to each child aged under 14 years. This means that the
poverty status of individuals is influenced by both the total disposable
household income (including non-wage income) and the household compo-
sition. The poverty status is based on the corrected family income but is
assigned to the individual. This means, for example, that a man and a
woman living in the same household are assumed to have the same equiv-
alised income irrespective of their individual income.
This means also that there is no strict direct relationship between ‘working
poor’ and “low-income workers”. Workers earning a low wage are not neces-
sarily poor; other household members can contribute to the household
income. On the other hand, workers can be poor despite getting a decent
wage (because of the household size and composition).
The “working poor” are therefore a section of the population that is difficult
to identify because the concept combines two levels of analysis: the working
status of individuals (individual level) and the income status of the house-
hold they live in, which is below the poverty threshold (collective level)
(European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
[Eurofound], 2010).
1.2 In-work poverty in Europe: figures2
The figures described below are based on the European Union Statistics on
Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC), organised by Eurostat. In the EU
SILC survey, information on social exclusion and housing conditions is col-
lected at household level while labour, education and health information is
obtained for persons aged 16 and over. The core of the instrument, namely
data concerning income at a very detailed component level, is mainly col-
lected at individual level but a few components are included in the house-
hold part of EU SILC. In EU SILC, people are defined as being employed
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based on their self-declared economic status. “Employed” is defined here as
being employed for over half of the year.
In 2009, the average risk of working age adults in the EU facing monetary
poverty was twice as high for the total population (16.1%) than it was for
those who were employed (8.4%).3 The risk increased to 26% for those who
were inactive and to 43% for those who were unemployed (European
Commission, 2011). In 2011 (based on Eurostat estimate for 2011), 8.7% of
the people in gainful employment were living under the poverty threshold
(European Commission, 2012). So having a job is still a good buffer against
poverty. But still 8.7% of the people having a job can be defined as being
poor.
This also means that those who have a job but are poor make up a very sig-
nificant proportion of those living in poverty: in 2011, the working poor rep-
resent one third of the (working age) adults living under the poverty thresh-
old (European Commission, 2012).
The proportion of workers living in poverty was relatively stable at European
level between 2005-2009 (see Table 1.1)4. But when taking a more detailed
look at the situation and evolution in the different member states, there
seems to be considerable differences between countries (see Table 1.1).
The member states with the lowest in-work poverty rate (below 5%) in 2009
were the Czech Republic (3.1%), Finland (3.7%), Slovakia (4.8%) and
Belgium (4.6%). Countries with a very high in-work poverty rate included
the Southern European countries like Greece (13.8%), Spain (11.4%), Italy
(10.2%) and Portugal (10.3%) as well as Latvia (11.1%), Poland (11.0%),
and Romania (17.9%). The in-work poverty rate in these countries was high-
er than 10% of the working population (with an extremely high figure of
17.9% of working poor in Romania).
2   Source: Employment and social developments in Europe 2011, Eurofound 2010, Working poor in Europe.
3 Workers with unlimited-term contracts face even much lower poverty risks than the average person employed (5.1% against 8.1%).
4   It is not possible yet to study the impact of the economic and financial crisis (since 2008), but in-work poverty seems to have been 
stable in the lead-up to the crisis (European Commission, 2012).
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When analysing the development at national level, for some countries the
figures indicate an increase in the in-work poverty rate (the rate rose by at
least 1 percentage point between 2005 and 2009): this is the case for
Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Spain and Sweden. In other
countries, the in-work poverty rate decreased between 2005 and 2009 by at
least 1 percentage point: Austria, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and
the United Kingdom.
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Table 1 Evolution of in-work poverty rate 2005-2009
Source Eurostat, EU SILC (European Commission, 2012)
Recent estimates for 2011 (Eurostat, European Commission 2012) show that
the EU in-work poverty rate (8.7%) has reached the highest level since
2005. The increasing shares of part-time and temporary workers in the total
employed population are likely to increase the in-work poverty rate, now
and in the years to come (see further, European Commission 2012). 
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2 Causes of in-work poverty5
As already explained, having a low-wage job does not necessarily mean that
the individual worker lives in poverty. The household composition is an
important factor. This chapter analyses the different factors causing in-work
poverty. 
Crettaz (2011) identified three main interacting factors causing in-work
poverty: low work intensity, family composition and low wages. 
Based on different country reports on in-work poverty and labour market
segmentation by national experts, the report on “In-work poverty and
labour market segmentation in the EU: Key lessons” (Frazer et al., 2010)
concludes that: “The explanatory factors for in-work poverty that emerge
from the experts’ reports reveal the interaction of a very complex set of fac-
tors. The main factors can be grouped under four headings: structure of
economy/labour market; family/household composition and low work inten-
sity; individual/personal characteristics and institutional factors (i.e. mini-
mum wage, tax & social protection)”.
2.1 Causes of in-work poverty
2.1.1 Causes on job level: low-wage work and work intensity
As already mentioned, having a job is still the best way out of poverty and
the best protection against poverty. But still 8.7% of all people gainfully
employed (EU-level) belong to the group of working poor.
The nature of the job seems to be important. But again, as already stated, 
it is the nature of jobs at household level that is  important, next to other
sources of income.
5   Source: Employment and social developments in Europe 2011, Eurofound 2010, Working poor in Europe.
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This section focuses on job-related elements that can influence the inci-
dence of in-work poverty.
First of all, having a low-paid job - even a permanent and full-time one -
can lead to in-work poverty. 
The global financial and economic crisis has considerably slowed down the
growth of real wages around the world. Based on official national statistics
from 115 countries and territories, the Global Wage Report 2010/11
(International Labour Organisation [ILO], 2010) estimates a decline in the
growth of real average monthly wages from 2.8% in 2007 to 1.5% in 2008
and to 1.6% in 2009.6
While the rate of wage growth slowed down in almost all countries, it turned
negative in more than a quarter of the countries and territories in 2008, and
in one fifth in 2009. In developed countries (including Western and
Southern Europe), the ILO report estimates that, after having grown at
about 0.8% per annum before the crisis, real wages actually decreased by
0.5% at the onset of the crisis in 2008 before growing at a rate of 0.6% in
2009. In Central and Eastern Europe, real wage growth fell from 6.6% in
2007 to 4.6% in 2008 and was at 0.1% in 2009. (ILO, 2010). 
Low-wage earners can be defined as those earning less than two thirds of
the national median wage (hourly based). The European Commission (2011)
calculated that the findings in the member states show a positive correla-
tion between in-work poverty rates and the percentage of low-wage earners.
However, while the correlation is significant, it is not absolute (0.42%),
which shows that in-work poverty is not only attributable to low wages.
Other factors like work intensity and household composition play an impor-
tant part (see below).
The factor “work intensity” describes the degree to which people are working
at their full potential. People working in a temporary or part-time job and
6   The global wage growth is calculated as a weighted average of actual or estimated year-on-year growth in real average monthly wages in
115 countries and territories, covering 94% of all gainfully employed persons in the world. For coverage and methodology, see Global
Wage Report 2010/11, Technical appendix I. Source: ILO Global Wage Database. 
Excluding China, the report calculates that real wage growth decreased from 2.2% in 2007 to 0.8% in 2008 and 0.7% in 2009.
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therefore not at their full potential can face in-work poverty, even if their
hourly wage can be considered as high.
Results reported in the above-mentioned European Commission study (2011)
show that in-work poverty is highly dependent on job characteristics like the
term and type of the work contract. Figures are indicating that the in-work
poverty rate is higher for people not working throughout the year (com-
pared with those working permanently),7 higher for people working in fixed-
term contracts (compared with people working in permanent contracts) and
higher for people working part-time (compared with people working full-
time). For instance, people working in permanent contracts face a much
lower poverty risks than the average person employed (5.1% against 8.1%).
The European Commission study concludes that – although no guarantee – 
it is a good safeguard against in-work poverty to have a permanent, full-
time job. 
Frazer et al. (2010) concluded also that the prevalence of extensive low-
quality and insecure employment combined with low wages greatly increases
the risk and extent of in-work poverty in some member states. Research has
also shown a correlation between elements of work intensity and the hourly
wages. Fixed-term contracts involve a higher percentage of low-wage earn-
ers. The Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI
2011) analysed the relationship between temporary work, part-time work
and hourly wages. The results show that on EU average, persons working
full-time on a fixed-term contract earn 17% less (based on hourly wages)
compared to the equivalent person working full-time on a permanent con-
tract. People working part-time on a permanent basis receive 4.7% less
hourly wage than the equivalent person working full-time on a permanent
contract. And finally, people working part-time on a temporary basis receive
7   Source EU SILC (Eurostat); 
Working full year corresponds to working during the total number of months for which information on the activity status has been pro-
vided. Less than full year corresponds to working more than half but less than all the number of months for which information on the
activity status has been provided. 
16.9% less hourly wage than somebody working full-time on a permanent
basis.
Figures from the Eurostat Labour Force Survey (reported in the EU
Employment and Social Situation quarterly review - September 2011) show
that in the period 2000-2010, the use of fixed-term contracts has steadily
grown. The share of employees with a fixed-term contract in the total num-
ber of employees rose from 12.2% in 2000 to 14.6% in 2007, before falling
to 14.1% and 13.6% in 2008-2009 and rising again in 2010 to 13.9%. This
segment of the labour market seems to have been the most sensitive one
during the crisis. If the trend to hire more on a temporary basis persists,
even countries with a relatively low share of fixed-term contracts could soon
see their share increase steeply as permanent workers exiting the labour
market will be replaced by workers with fixed-term contracts.
The percentage of part-time employment in the total employment also rose
constantly, from 15.7% in 2002 to 18.5% in 2010. 
Stagnating wages and the increase of fixed-term contracts and (involuntary)
part-time work have increased the number of persons with low income at EU
level. Several country experts on in-work poverty (Frazer et al., 2010) link
low-quality employment with the effects of economic globalisation and its
role in creating a segmented labour market. One of the effects of segmenta-
tion is to increase the risk of in-work poverty. Highly segmented labour mar-
kets trap people in poorly paid jobs and result in low upward mobility. The
prevalence of low wages and insecure employment is particularly evident
amongst certain sectors of the economy, for instance farmers and the self-
employed. If people remain in such contracts, the risk of becoming trapped
in in-work poverty exists. This could undermine the inclusive growth objec-
tive of the Europe 2020 strategy by only moving towards the target of more
jobs but not necessarily better jobs (European Commission, 2011).
17
18
2.1.2 Causes at household level: household composition and work
intensity at household level
Not only work characteristics have an impact on in-work poverty, it is also
significantly influenced by household characteristics.
As stated above, the number of dependant members in a household is a
decisive factor for in-work poverty. The size and composition of the house-
hold are not only an important element because of the impact the number
of dependants has on the available income. It is also important because
having children can influence labour market participation and work intensity
of household members.
Furthermore, depending on the respective welfare system, the number of
children may influence non-wage income through child benefits.
Figures based on the EU SILC show that in general workers living in house-
holds consisting of two or more adults without children have the lowest in-
work poverty risk (5%). 10% of the single working people are living in
poverty. Furthermore, 10% of the workers living in households with depend-
ent children are living in poverty. The highest risk of in-work poverty is
faced by workers living in a single-parent family with dependent children:
18% of them are living in poverty.
But it is not only the size and composition of the household that matters. 
Of course, looking at the employment situation and the work intensity of the
household is important. In a situation where too few adults in the house-
hold work or where they do not work enough to earn an adequate household
income, the risk of poverty is high. Therefore, the Social Protection
Committee (SPC)8 has defined a variable entitled “Work intensity at house-
8   The SPC is a Treaty-based committee (Article 160 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU) which was formally created through Council
Decisions in 2000 and 2004. The SPC serves as a vehicle for cooperative exchange between Member States and the European Commission
in the framework of the Open Method of Co-ordination on social inclusion, health care and long-term care as well as pensions (“Social”
OMC). In particular, the Committee plays a central role in preparing the discussion in the Council on the annual Joint Report on Social
Protection and Social Inclusion. The Committee also prepares reports, formulates opinions or undertakes other work within its fields of
competence, at the request of either the Council or the Commission or on its own initiative. The SPC is composed of two delegates from
each Member State and the Commission. 
hold level”. This indicator reflects the percentage of the available annual
working time of all adults of working age in the household for which they
were in employment.9
The risk of poverty of all adults aged 18-59 (being unemployed, inactive,
employed) in relation to household work intensity is being discussed. The
estimates for 2009 show that 9.4% of the adults live in households with very
low work intensity (0-20%, including jobless households). 5.6% of the
adults live in households with low work intensity (20-40%). Nearly 20% of
the adults live in households with medium work intensity (40-60%), 17% in
households with high work intensity (60-80%) and nearly 50%10 in house-
holds with very high work intensity (80-100%).
The EU-27 results, as presented, mask the differences between the member
states. In all member states the majority of adults live in households with
very high work intensity. In the Baltic States, Denmark, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia and Slovenia, more than 60% of the adults live in households with
very high work intensity. Different mechanisms can explain this high per-
centage. In the new member states, the high percentage can possibly be
explained by the low hourly wages, making people work longer hours. The
high proportion of adults in households with very high work intensity in
Denmark can most likely be explained by the high labour market participa -
tion of women (and the availability of facilitating services encouraging high
labour market participa tion, see below).
Most Southern European countries have a lower percentage of adults living
in households with very high work intensity. This can be explained by the
more traditional family models with a low female labour market participa-
tion. In countries where part-time work is widespread (and encouraged by
19
9  The household work intensity variable has recently (since 2010) been adjusted, in the framework of the Europe 2020 Strategy. It is
defined as the ratio between the number of months that adults (aged 18-59, not being a student aged 18-24) worked and the total num-
ber of months that adults in the same household could have worked in theory. For persons who declared having worked part-time, an
estimate of the number of months in terms of Full-Time Equivalents (FTE) is computed on the basis of the number of hours usually worked
at the time of the interview.
10 This group includes a large number of full-time employed persons in one-person households.
government measures) (for instance Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden) we
see a higher percentage of adults in households with a high work intensity
level (compared to the EU average).
The European Commission (2011) examined the link between the level of
work intensity at household level and the risk of poverty among adults. The
evidence suggests that when household work intensity increases beyond
20%, the risk of poverty begins to drop significantly (from 50-55% to 40%)
but stays high. 20% of the adults living in households with medium work
intensity live below the national poverty threshold. 8% of the adults living
in households with a household work intensity of 60-70% live in poverty,
household work intensity of 70-80% brings the rate down to 7.5%. Very high
work intensity at household level decreases the poverty rate significantly
(5.4% in the 80-90% work intensity bracket, 4.5% in the 90-100% work
intensity bracket). As the European Commission (2011) concluded in terms
of policy, this suggests that increasing the labour market participation of
adults belonging to households with a work intensity below 60% is impor-
tant in combating poverty.
But sometimes, working at (almost) full potential is not enough. In coun-
tries such as France, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Romania,
Spain, Slovakia and Slovenia, only living in households with a very high
work intensity rate (more than 80%) offers protection from the poverty risk.
In these countries, wages (which are generally the most important compo-
nent of income) are probably still too low to fight poverty. 
On the other hand, in some member states (Denmark, Ireland) a lower work
intensity level is sufficient to reduce the risk of poverty for adults. 
The European Commission (2011) suggests that this may reflect flexible and
well functioning labour markets and well developed institutional support
(incl. good income support for those not working at their full potential). 
Policies that provide those employed with adequate income support (for
instance minimum wages) as well as supplementary income from social secu-
rity and tax systems play an important role in fighting in-work poverty
(European Commission, 2011).
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Frazer et al. (2010) conclude: “Institutional factors such as the lack of regu-
lations establishing an adequate minimum wage, relatively high taxes on low
wages, the lack of in-work benefits, the forcing of people off benefits and
into low paid work, inadequate child income support, the lack or high cost
of essential services (e.g. child care and public transport), ... can contribute
to in-work poverty. To put it more positively, in several member states with
low rates of in-work poverty it is clear that factors such as low wages and
insecure employment have been mitigated by positive institutional arrange-
ments which ensure that the net income of households is adequate. Another
important institutional factor in several member states is the role played by
adequate minimum wage arrangements.”
2.2 In-work poverty by individual characteristics
Labour market research has shown that the intensity and quality of work
varies across population groups: women, young people, migrants and low-
skilled people are facing a higher risk of underemployment and of working in
more precarious jobs. 
The risk of in-work poverty can be greatly increased by certain individual
factors such as poor education, poor health and nationality which interact
with other risk factors. Low levels of education and qualifications increase
the likelihood of in-work poverty as they lead workers towards low-paid sec-
tors and insecure jobs. In many countries, being a migrant or from an ethnic
minority can considerably increase the risk of in-work poverty. Age is also a
factor and in many countries young people face particular risks of in-work
poverty (Frazer et al., 2010).
The results show that despite their more precarious position on the labour
market, women are not more likely to be part of the working poor; at EU-
level the in-work poverty risk for men is higher than for women. This can
partly be explained by the household situation and by the fact that working
women are often second earners in a household. So despite the generally
21
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less positive situation of women on the labour market (more part-time work
and fixed-term contracts), the risk of in-work poverty seems higher for men
(at EU level and in most countries).
In-work poverty (EU level) tends to slightly decrease with age. Again, house-
hold circumstances matter: in some countries where young people leave
their family and become financially independent at an early age, the in-work
poverty risk is higher than in other countries where the young tend to stay
at home longer even when having a job. Young people work more often in
part-time and fixed-term jobs than older people.
At EU level, there seems to be a strong link between education and the risk
of in-work poverty. The higher the level of qualification, the lower the inci-
dence of in-work poverty. Among the lower-skilled group, the incidence of
part-time and fixed-term jobs is higher than for other skill groups.
In an ILO study analysing the patterns, causes and consequences of low-paid
work, Grimshaw (2011) concluded that some groups are facing a higher risk
of low-wage work, simply because of their skin colour or ethnic background.
Although no figures are available, we can assume that ethnic labour market
segmentation leads to a higher risk of in-work poverty for people with a for-
eign ethnic background. Based on the analysis made by country experts,
Frazer et al. (2010) stated: “In many countries, being a migrant or from an
ethnic minority can greatly increase the risk of in-work poverty. (…) The
Dutch experts note groups with a relatively high risk of in-work poverty
include non-western migrants. The Finnish experts comment that ‘the work-
related poverty of immigrants in Finland is two-fold: firstly there is the gen-
eral labour market position and difficulties in employment and secondly the
segregation of professions into ethnic and non-ethnic varieties’. The Italian
expert points out that migrants are very often employed in unskilled jobs.”
Characteristics of the employer or sector can define the chances of more
low-wage work. For instance, the location of the organisation, the organisa-
tion’s size, the organisation’s activities/sector, whether the organisation is
family-owned or not, competition on the market, ... are all factors co-deter-
mining the chances of having a low-wage job.
2.3 Econometric analysis of the determinants of in-work
poverty11
The previous sections described the three main factors that can lead to in-
work poverty: inadequate hourly/monthly pay, low work intensity and the
household structure. We have also established that there is a certain inter-
action between the described factors. To study the interplay between the
described mechanisms and to examine more formally the characteristics
associated with in-work poverty (including a set of individual characteris-
tics), the European Commission (2011) reported the results of an economet-
ric analysis (likelihood ratios based on logit regression analysis) on the
determinants of in-work poverty at individual level. For each factor, the like-
lihood of in-work poverty is estimated controlling all other factors.
The results show that at EU level, low work intensity (household level) and
low wage seem to be the key determinants. Being a low-wage worker
increases the likelihood of in-work poverty five times. Furthermore, working
at less than half of the household’s full potential increases the risk of in-
work poverty more than five times. Marx et al. (2011) calculated that
increasing work intensity at household level does more to reduce poverty
more than raising low wages.
A lesser but still important role is played by household composition
(child/adult ratio): the likelihood of poverty increases with a rising number
of dependent children, but less than for the two other factors.
Individual characteristics (in particular education and work experience) all
play a significant role for in-work poverty but much less so than the three
main factors discussed. Involuntary part-time work and having a fixed-term
contract both influences the likelihood of in-work poverty (by a factor of 2.7
and 1.5 respectively).
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11   Source: employment and social developments in Europe 2011.
The analyses were repeated on member state level. The results show that the
three most important factors have a different impact and importance across
countries in Europe, depending on the wage structures, the presence of min-
imum wages or wage bargaining structures, the presence of family support
systems, ... Therefore, we can conclude (in line with the European
Commission analysis) that policies securing adequate incomes (for instance
minimum wages) as well as supplementary incomes from social security and
tax systems can play an important role in fighting in-work poverty
(European Commission, 2011).
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PART 2
HOW TO TACKLE IN-WORK POVERTY?
3 Policies for fighting in-work poverty: 
general remarks
3.1 Creating jobs versus making work pay
Fighting in-work poverty is all about “making work pay”. Having paid
employment should be a guarantee for having sufficient income and a
decent standard of living. Therefore, employment should be accessible to all,
it should be of high quality, well paid and harness the potential of the 
worker. 
Nevertheless, concrete policy measures to make work pay may increase the
costs of creating jobs and therefore reduce the overall employment opportu-
nities of citizens. Policies reducing the number of working poor could
increase the number of non-working poor. Policy responses should consider
this possible trade-off and go for policies that at the same time make work
pay and increase employment opportunities for low-skilled workers so they
can escape poverty through integration in the labour market.
3.2 Substantive and procedural policy
“Policy” can be approached with a focus on the substantive policies or on
the procedures with which a policy is made. A focus on the substantive
issues describes what is implemented, which rules and regulations are put in
place in order to realise specific policy goals. A focus on the procedural part
describes how policies are shaped, which stakeholders are included in the
policy-making process and so on. 
In the following section, the primary focus is on substantive policy, yet pro-
cedural issues also play an important role in fighting in-work poverty.
Social and labour market policies can be shaped in the context of intense
social dialogue or through unilateral governmental action. In some coun-
tries, the social dialogue has a bipartite character whereas in other coun-
tries the state is involved as an important third stakeholder. These procedur-
al differences have an impact on how substantive policies are shaped and
implemented. 
On a macro level, we see that in countries with strong unions and intense
social dialogue, social inequality is relatively lower compared to countries
where workers’ organisations play a lesser role (Koeniger, Leonardi &
Nunziata, 2006). Moreover, research shows that the incidence of low-wage
work is linked to the role of unions and the level of co-ordination of collec-
tive bargaining (Bosch, 2009). 
When plotting the relation between the “European Participation Index”
(summarising the degree to which employees participate through the board,
on company level and through collective bargaining), for instance, and in-
work poverty, the
results indicate that
the more employees
participate on the
different levels, the
less the country
faces problems
related to in-work
poverty.
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3.3 Substantive policies in a context of activation
The following section focuses on several substantive policies that can be
developed in the fight against in-work poverty. We focus on the role 
workers’ organisations can play in this regard.
These policies are often embedded in a political context of “activation” of
the labour market and a general trend towards “flexicurity” policies in vari-
ous European countries. The European Union supports these policy direc-
tions with the “Lisbon Strategy” or the more recent ‘Europe 2020’ initiatives.
Yet, thoughtless activation and flexibilisation without proper security sys-
tems can increase the incidence of in-work poverty. 
3.4 Reducing in-work poverty through better income and
decent work
The econometric analysis of the European Commission showed that low pay
and low work intensity at household level are the primary reasons for in-
work poverty in Europe. Therefore, workers’ organisations should concen-
trate on these two issues in order to fight the growing phenomenon of the
working poor. Recent developments - partly due to the economic and finan-
cial crisis - indicate a slowdown of the wage increase in Europe and a rise of
part-time work and fixed-term contracts.
Therefore, policies should be developed and promoted that guarantee ade-
quate income for workers and work intensity should be increased by promot-
ing decent work which is stable, provides sufficient working hours and is
accessible for all groups of workers.
The following section focuses on these two major policy strategies and
defines what workers’ organisations can do.
4 Ensuring adequate income for employees
Although in-work poverty depends on the family income and not on the
individual income of a worker, econometric evidence shows that low pay is a
primary cause for in-work poverty in Europe. Workers’ organisations should
therefore develop policies that guarantee adequate income for employees,
they should ‘make work pay’ in financial terms. This chapter discusses the
role workers’ organisations can play in promoting statutory minimum wages
or voluntary wage increases.
4.1 Statutory minimum wages
Workers’ organisations and other NGOs frequently refer to minimum wages as
a basic element to ”make work pay” and fight in-work poverty. Yet, there are
still discussions about the impact of introducing or increasing minimum
wages on the rate of in-work poverty on the one hand and on general
employment on the other. Using scientific findings, we here discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of using statutory minimum wages as an
instrument in the fight against in-work poverty.
Further, we will discuss the role of workers’ organisations in pushing for the
introduction of minimum wages. For this purpose, we refer to national and
European campaigns and stress the importance of the continuing fight for
the “indexation” (inflation adjustment) of minimum wages.
4.1.1 Fighting in-work poverty through statutory minimum wages?
Introducing (or raising) a statutory minimum wage has an immediate posi-
tive effect on the lowest wage groups in a country. It therefore seems to be
a straightforward and effective policy instrument for fighting low pay and
thus reducing in-work poverty. 
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Nevertheless, researchers have very different opinions on the effectiveness
of statutory minimum wages in the fight against in-work poverty. We discuss
the primary advantages and disadvantages of introducing (or raising) a
statutory minimum wage.
Advantages of statutory minimum wages:
– Minimum wages reduce in-work poverty as they guarantee a decent wage
for every full-time worker. Employers are forced to pay at least the mini-
mum wage t so that extremely low-paid jobs will disappear; 
– Moreover, as a statutory minimum wage ” creates a certain “foundation”,
low-wage competition between companies will be limited, reducing the
incentive and economic need to pay very low wages; 
– Furthermore, introducing or increasing a statutory minimum wage does
not only raise the wages of the minimum wage earners. Spill-over effects
occur. To this effect, research in developing countries showed that even
the wages in the informal sector are positively affected by increases in the
statutory minimum wage (Saget, 2001). Wages just above the minimum
wage will be similarly affected by an increase in the minimum wage;
– The wages of other low-wage earners tend to increase as well with the
introduction of a (higher) minimum wage (OECD, 1998). The positive
income effect thus affects more employees than the very low-wage work-
ers; 
– Another positive consequence of a (higher) minimum wage is higher
aggregate demand as a result of higher incomes (however, the effect of
this consequence on in-work poverty is indirect); 
– Higher wages which are the result of a (higher) minimum wage also
increase the incentive for the unemployed to search and accept paid
employment. This might positively affect employment and activity rates
and can reduce government expenditure on unemployment and social ben-
efits; 
– Research also indicates that higher wages in low-income jobs have a posi-
tive, albeit limited effect on employee motivation and productivity
(Salverda, 2009); 
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– And finally, another advantage of minimum wages currently very impor-
tant is that they only produce low public expenditure. Apart from the
costs related to the enforcement and application of the minimum wage,
introducing or increasing the minimum wage has no impact on the state
budget. In the context of the current public debt crisis in Europe, this is
an important advantage.
Nevertheless, opponents of (higher) minimum wages point to the possible
negative employment effects of a statutory minimum wage, the untargeted
effect of minimum wages for fighting in-work poverty and the possible stim-
ulation of informal employment (as employers wishing to pay sub-minimum
wages cannot do so legally).
Disadvantages of statutory minimum wages: 
– The main argument of the opponents is that (high) minimum wages
decrease employment and thus the possibility of the poor to escape pover-
ty by searching and accepting paid employment. 
Literature on the effect of minimum wages on employment is rather
mixed. Yet, most studies cannot find a statistically relevant negative cor-
relation between minimum wages and employment in general. Focusing on
certain parts of the labour market (unskilled labour, teenage or young
workers), more significant (although small) results are found (Edagbami,
2006). Scientific literature indicates that a minimum wage can have detri-
mental employment effects on specific groups in the labour market. More
specifically, employment opportunities for young and teenage workers
could be negatively affected by a minimum wage. Nevertheless, these neg-
ative effects can be compensated by the introduction of a multi-level, age-
related minimum wage (as it is the case in several European countries
such as Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, The
Netherlands, Slovakia, and the UK).
In conclusion, we can say that there is a trade-off between the quality and
quantity of jobs, but its importance should not to be overestimated
(Doucouliagos & Stanley, 2009); 
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– Yet, for fighting in-work poverty, a minimum wage is a rather blunt and
non-specific instrument. It affects a greater population than the working
poor (as most low-paid employees are not working poor) and affects only
a certain share of the working poor (as most working poor have an income
than is above the minimum wage). The effect on in-work poverty should
therefore not be overestimated. Studies comparing different policy alter-
natives (Marx, Vanhille & Ver bist, 2011) conclude that a minimum wage
does not seem to be the best policy option for effectively fighting in-work
poverty.
4.1.2 A minimum wage, which minimum wage?
Statutory minimum wages are relatively common in over 20 of the 27 EU
member states. Yet, having a minimum wage is in itself not enough to effec-
tively fight in-work poverty. First of all, the effectiveness of a minimum
wage policy depends on the degree of centralisation of collective bargaining
and the coverage of collective agreements (European Commission, 2012, p.
164). It also depends on the level (or levels) of the minimum wage and the
composition of the working poor (see further). 
4.1.2.1 Composition of the working poor
In countries in which the working poor consist predominantly of full-time
workers and those with an unlimited-term contract, the effect of a minimum
wage is likely to be greater (OECD, 1998). Based on the EU SILC data (see
Figures 4.1 & 4.2), we can estimate in which countries the introduction or
increase of a minimum wage will have the greatest effect on in-work pover-
ty. 
As discussed above, in-work poverty is more prominent among workers with
a part-time or fixed-term job. Yet in countries like Greece, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania and Spain, more than 10% of the full-time employees can
be considered to be working poor. And countries like Cyprus, Germany, Italy,
31
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Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Poland have the largest shares of
employees with permanent contracts living in poverty. We can assume that
the introduction (or increase) of the minimum wage in these countries will
have the greatest effect on the in-work poverty rates.
Figure 1 Proportion of working poor in part-time and full-time employment
in Europe
Source Eurostat – EU SILC data
In a country like Finland, with a very low general share of in-work poverty
and low in-work poverty among workers having an unlimited-term and full-
time job, an increase of the minimum wage will have little impact on the in-
work poverty rate.
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Figure 2 Proportion of working poor in fixed-term and permanent contracts
in Europe
Source Eurostat – EU SILC data
4.1.2.2 Level of the minimum wage
As mentioned above, minimum wages in Europe are relatively widespread:
more than 20 of the 27 EU member states have minimum wages. Yet, having
a minimum wage is in itself not enough to effectively fight in-work poverty.
It all depends on the level of the minimum wage. Great differences exist
between the minimum wages of different countries in terms of purchasing
power standards (Figure 4.3) or in relation to the average or median
income. 
A comparison shows that countries with minimum wages lower than 50% of
the median wage or lower than 40% of the average wage have significantly
higher rates of in-work poverty than countries with minimum wages above
this threshold. Hence, it is not just having a minimum wage that matters,
the level of the minimum wage is of great importance, too.
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Furthermore, we observe that several new member states have minimum
wages, but they are significantly lower than the national poverty threshold.
Figure 3 National minimum wages in Europe in April 2012 (per hour, in pur-
chasing power standards [PPS])
Source European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) Policy Brief 5/2012
A minimum wage for fighting in-work poverty?
Advantages of a minimum wage
 Guaranteed decent wage for low-wage earners
 Increase of low wages through spill-over effects
 Increase of the aggregate demand
 Increased incentive to accept paid employment, ‘work pays’
 Increased employee motivation
 Small impact on public budget
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Disadvantages of a minimum wage
 Possible decrease in low-skilled & youth employment
 Blunt instrument to fight in-work poverty
 Impact depends on level and context
Remark
 Effect depends on type of in-work poverty
 Level of minimum wage is important (50% of median income)
 Reduced minimum wages for young workers
4.1.3 What can workers’ organisations do?
We quote some examples of the role workers’ organisations can play in push-
ing for (statutory) minimum wages.
4.1.3.1 National campaigns
a) German example
In-work poverty is a particular problem in Germany. From 2005 to 2011, the
in-work poverty rate went from 4.8% to 7.7%, an increase of about 2.9 per-
centage points, which is the worst evolution of all countries in Europe.
Nevertheless, workers’ organisations didn’t fight for the introduction of min-
imum wages in the past as collective bargaining was well established and
various sectors had different minimum wages. However, the influence of
trade unions on the wages in Germany is weakening. Collective bargaining
coverage is declining and the government-backed introduction of so-called
mini-jobs puts downward pressure on wages in all sectors (Bispinck &
Schulten, 2011).
Therefore, the relatively small union “Gewerkschaft Nahrung-Genuss-
Gaststätten” (NGG) for the food, beverages and catering sectors launched a
plea for the introduction of statutory minimum wages. After some hesita-
tion, the larger service sector union “Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft”
(Ver.di), took over the idea and started a bigger political campaign. It took
Ver.di about six years of discussion before the “Deutsche
Gewerkschaftsbund”/German Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB) congress
voted in favour of a statutory minimum wage. This was followed by the DGB
launching a large-scale campaign for the introduction of a minimum wage
(mindestlohn.de). 
More than 4,000 huge banners were distributed all over the country and an
intensive internet campaign was set up in co-operation with a company hav-
ing experience in campaigning for union initiatives (wegewerke.de). Using
text messages, people could express their support of the campaign and this
way more than 20,000 text message signatures were collected. Using
research results, interactive ‘Google maps’ were elaborated which reported
minimum wages in different regions together with the contact addresses of
several members of the federal state parliaments (and their opinion on a
minimum wage) so that activists and citizens could directly contact them.
Brochures were designed which treated twenty misconceptions on the mini-
mum wage, substantiated by scientific evidence. At the party convention of
the “Christliche Demokratische Union”/Christian Democratic Union (CDU),
the trade union provided brochures in the typical CDU style defending the
introduction of a minimum wage as a way to exert pressure on CDU politi-
cians to include the demand for a minimum wage in the congress resolutions
(Wegewerk, 2012). Furthermore, surveys were held and the results were pre-
sented to the media and used in campaigning material and even on ‘Second
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Life’ (an online virtual world), the minimum wage campaign was continued. 
Public campaigning was accompanied by political lobby work towards the
“Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands”/Social-Democratic Party (SPD),
the “Bündnis 90/Die Grünen”/Green party (Grüne) and the CDU. As a result,
both the SPD and the Green Party adopted the demand for a minimum wage. 
The ruling coalition officially rejected the demand, yet also in these parties
a growing number of members support the idea of a statutory minimum
wage (Bispinck & Schulten, 2011). To be con tinued. 
b) Swiss example
In Switzerland, minimum wages were traditionally discussed and agreed
upon on industry level. Although the collective agreement coverage was
mediocre (50%), wages were generally high due to a tight labour market
and a low level of unemployment. Nevertheless, as a result of a long period
of recession and larger scale immigration, unemployment rates went up and
low wages became an issue, predominantly in the service industries. 
Therefore, the newly created services union UNIA felt the need for the
establishment of a minimum wage, stipulated by collective agreement. The
initial proposal to introduce wage subsidies in the low-pay sectors was
quickly abandoned and replaced by a public campaign for a minimum wage.
The minimum wage was to be determined by collective agreements in indi-
vidual industries. What is Crucial in this campaign is the development of a
catchy slogan – ‘no wages below 3,000 francs’ – and the decision not to
campaign for the introduction of a minimum wage via parliament, but to
focus on public campaigning and collective bargaining in individual indus-
tries (Oesch & Rieger, 2006). 
The Swiss unions first developed an intensive media campaign which was to
win the hearts and minds of the Swiss for minimum wages. Studies and
reports on the employment conditions of the working poor in Switzerland
served as instruments to raise the public awareness for the issue of low pay.
Secondly, an economic argument for the introduction of minimum wages was
developed through studies that established an ‘optimum minimum wage’
and estimated effects of introducing a minimum wage on the Swiss econo-
my. Furthermore, action was taken in several industries in which low pay
was a specific issue. Strong media campaigning supported the demands of
the unions and a “naming-and-shaming” strategy was developed in order to
exert pressure on big companies to accept higher minimum wages which
were applicable to broader categories of employees. 
Oesch & Rieger (2006) evaluated the campaign and concluded that the cam-
paign had several positive effects on wages in Switzerland:
– A disproportional increase of the wages of low-skilled workers;
– Minimum wages in various low-pay sectors were increased to
3,000 francs;
– A widening of the wage gap was prevented.
In addition, the campaign had positive effects on the image of trade unions
and put a stop to the neo-liberal consensus that any form of workers’ pro-
tection is negative for the economic development.
In 2009, however, the Swiss unions changed their perspective and started
campaigning for the introduction of a statutory minimum wage. They joined
forces with different NGOs and political parties and started the
“Mindestlöhne jetzt!” (Minimum wages now!) campaign to collect enough
signatures to demand a referendum on the issue. In March 2012, the peo-
ple’s initiative was officially accepted, so it is most likely that a referendum
on the issue will follow. 
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National campaigns for a minimum wage: success factors
1. Intensive media campaigns;
2. Using various communication channels;
3. Using strong arguments, based on studies and reports;
4. Developing an economic argument;
5. Developing a catchy slogan;
6. Lobbying politicians;
7. Mobilising union activists;
8. Finding striking cases – naming and shaming;
9. Organising surveys & communicating the results broadly.
4.1.3.2 EU minimum wage policy
As trade union power differs from one member state to the other, the likeli-
hood that unions can effectively push for the introduction or increase of
minimum wages depends on the national setting. Nevertheless, the EU in
general would benefit from comparable minimum wages in all members
states as they decrease the incentive for downward wage competition
between member states. 
Researchers like Schulten (T. Schulten et al., 2005; T. Schulten, 2002, 2012)
therefore propose to harmonise the different EU policies towards a relative
minimum wage, depending on the national context. In the first place,
Schulten (2002) proposes to increase the European minimum wages to at
least 50% of the national average wage. Schulten (2002) sees the (then
newly established) “Method of Open Coordination” (OMC) as a sound policy
instrument for the implementation and development of the European mini-
mum wage. He identifies two tasks the trade unions: (1) being involved in
the adoption and continuation of the (OMC-inspired) minimum wage policy
and (2) supporting these policies by internally co-ordinating collective bar-
gaining strategies. 
It is clear that developing a minimum wage policy is not on the current pri-
ority list of the European Commission, nor of the European Council.
Therefore European trade unions can play a role in pushing for the adoption
of a European minimum wage policy. Before taking action on the minimum
wage topic, the different European trade unions must first reach an agree-
ment; the demand for a minimum wage was not included in the European
Trade Union Confederation’s (ETUC) “Athens Manifesto” due to union dis-
agreement (ETUC, 2011).
While agreement between the affiliates of the ETUC is preferable, unions can
exert pressure on the European Union to take action on the subject of mini-
mum wages in other ways. Traditional lob-
bying and mobilising are options. However,
a new option has been available since 1
April 2012: “the European citizens’ initia-
tive”. 
Networks of European citizens can launch a
citizens’ poll and collect signatures to sup-
port their cause. When reaching a certain
minimum number, an official demand is
submitted to the European Commission to
launch an initiative on the subject. The European trade unions can use this
instrument to push the agenda on minimum wages and at the same time
create public awareness and support for the issue.
4.1.3.3 Inflation adjustment of minimum wages
As a result of inflation, the purchasing power of wages decreases over time.
Without the regular adjustment of the wages, employees see the risk of join-
ing the ranks of the working poor increasing with the passing of time. In
Europe, wages, unemployment benefits and minimum wages are frequently
adjusted to compensate for inflation. Nevertheless, these adjust ments are
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rarely automatic, are restricted to the legally stipulated minimum or do not
apply to all employees in the private sector. 
As in several countries the nominal minimum wage was raised only slightly
or was actually frozen in 2011 while consumer prices have been rising more
rapidly, the real value of the minimum wage, taking into account inflation,
has decreased in a number of countries (ETUI Policy Brief, 2012). Recent fig-
ures for 2011 show a decrease of the real minimum wages in the majority of
the countries under review.
Figure 4 Increase of real minimum wages in 2011, in %
Source: ETUI Policy Brief 5/2012
While the adjustment of the minimum wage should maintain the purchasing
power of the workers concerned, it doesn’t guarantee the income of workers
receiving wages slightly above the minimum wage. 
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Automatic wage indexation systems are implemented in countries like
Belgium, Cyprus and Luxemburg and used to as an appropriate mechanism
to fight and prevent an increase of in-work poverty in these countries
(Eurofound, 2010). 
4.2 Stimulating voluntary wage increases
The next section discusses the role workers’ organisations can play in push-
ing for voluntary wage increases.
4.2.1 Promoting a “living wage”
Although many countries have statutory minimum wages, they are often
rather low and insufficient to guarantee a decent living. Minimum wages are
a “minimum” and therefore hardly sufficient for employees to reach a decent
standard of living. Consequently, unions and other organisations in the US,
Canada and the UK have launched the concept of a “living wage”. Based on
a survey of household expenditures, these organisations determined a wage
level considered sufficient for a decent standard of living in a certain con-
text. Apart from calling for higher minimum wages, unions in the US and in
the UK resort to pushing individual employers and local authorities to pay at
least the “living wage” or more to their workers. Alliances of unions, anti-
poverty organisations, NGOs, churches and other local organisations call for
the establishment and dissemination of the living wage through public cam-
paigns, union actions, political lobbying, research and media campaigns. 
Local governments can be convinced to pay the living wage and only work
with subcontractors doing the same. Some successful examples are to be
found in London (Balazard, 2011) and the US (Niedt, Ruiters, Wise &
Schoenberger, 1999).
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In the US, trade unions co-operate with multiple other civil society organi-
sations (including local partners) to make a case for the establishment and
payment of living wages. They mobilise and organise precarious workers.
They focus on local government. The unions involved are mostly public sec-
tor unions which can effectively campaign for the introduction of the living
wage in public procurement procedures. This guarantees decent pay for
workers of subcontractors. 
Success factors of these campaigns are the combination of lobbying activi-
ties and public campaigns, the inclusion of employers in the organisation
which are supportive of the living wage idea and active community involve-
ment of the union. Further, the support of researchers who can provide data
and evidence for the campaign and respond to criticism is vital
(Kloosterboer, 2007, p. 77). 
4.2.2 Using public procurement to increase wages
Public procurement is an interesting and direct tool for fighting in-work
poverty. As public contracts account for about one fifth of the gross domes-
tic product (GDP) in many countries (Schulten, 2012), decisions on public
contracts are of crucial social and economic importance. 
By including criteria related to decent pay and decent work, public institu-
tions can prevent their subcontractors from paying sub-minimum wages
turning their employees into working poor. 
There are, however, certain limits. Public procurement in Europe is governed
by the EU Public Procurement Directive 2004. Including references to decent
work is allowed under this directive, yet different interpretations exist on
the extent to which work-related aspects can be taken into consideration in
granting public contracts.
A recent assessment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) limits the liberty
of public authorities to include clauses related to labour conditions in public
tenders. In the Rüffert ruling, the ECJ judged that public authorities cannot
oblige contractors to pay at least the wages set by collective agreements.
Nevertheless, public authorities can still demand decent pay from public
contractors by referring to “procurement minimum wages” or generally
applicable collective agreements (Schulten, 2012).
What can workers’ organisations do? A coalition of unions and NGOs tried to
influence the EU directive on public procurement. The purpose was to review
the rather neo-liberal character of the EU directive which gave absolute pri-
ority to the “lowest price” as a criterion for awarding public contracts. “The
Coalition for Green and Social Procurement” sought to include criteria refer-
ring to labour standards and sustainable development but was only partly
successful in doing so (Bieler, 2010). One of the reasons why it couldn’t fun-
damentally influence the decision-making process is the reluctance of the
coalition members to go beyond the mere lobbying strategy. 
With the recent case law on the evaluation of the public procurement direc-
tive, the coalition re-launched its activities. In a recent ETUC position paper
(2012), it demanded that social and environmental considerations should be
compulsory criteria in public tenders.
Other actions workers’ organisations and unions can take are (Bell &
Alastair, 2007) to promote:
– reference to the principal ILO conventions in the tender;
– including labour standards in product specification or contracts;
– excluding contractors that violate labour standards;
– the monitoring of contractual performance conditions;
– …
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5 Work intensity through decent work
Besides low pay, the second most important cause of in-work poverty is low
work intensity. Non-permanent employment due to insecure work contracts,
part-time work or flexible working hours and the fact that it is simply impos-
sible for some people to accept a permanent and full-time job are the main
drivers of low-work intensity. 
These issues are part of the core business of workers’ organisations, which 
is why they are treated by almost all workers’ organisations on a daily basis. 
In general, three strategies can be adopted for increasing work intensity.
The first two are policy initiatives focusing on the job, whereas the third
strategy focuses on the employee. First, workers’ organisations can try to
reduce the incidence of atypical labour contracts which lead to low work
intensity. They can do so by calling for regulation or limiting the use of
these contracts on company level. Secondly, workers’ organisations can
insist on upgrading the quality of atypical work so that workers having such
atypical employment    are guaranteed a quality job. At last, workers’ organi-
sations can also focus on the employee and push for policies that enable
workers to search for and accept permanent and full-time employment. 
5.1 Reducing the incidence of atypical work
In the context of the Europe-wide “flexicurity” agenda, the use of atypical
work contracts is flexibilised. This leads to an increased use of part-time and
fixed-term employment all over Europe. 
Various workers’ organisations have opposed this policy direction and called
for regulation on the use of such atypical contracts.
5.1.1 Regulation
Workers’ organisations and trade unions can promote regulation on different
levels. 
On European level, the ETUC plays a role in criticising the overall EU drive
towards flexibility. Through lobbying work, press releases and publications,
the ETUC tries to influence the Euro pean agenda, albeit with limited success. 
On the national level, various workers’ organisations oppose further flexibil-
isa tion and related activation policies of the unemployed (Pedersini, 2008).
Yet, union actions on these levels only have limited success and mostly con-
sists in containing further labour market flexibility measures. 
5.1.2 Limitation
In addition to fighting for better or sustained regulation on the use of atyp-
ical work contracts, workers’ organisations can at the same time take initia-
tives to limit the use of such contracts in sectors and individual companies.
When negotiating collective agreements, trade unions can push for special
regulation or the introduction of quotas governing the use of atypical forms
of work in individual sectors and companies. Nevertheless, as atypical work-
ers are generally less unionised and mainly work in sectors where the unions
have less power, special campaigns to reach out to these workers are need-
ed. 
An example of an innovative union campaign that aimed at reducing and
containing the use of atypical work contracts is the “Better not cheaper”
campaign of IG Metall. In this campaign, the German metalworkers’ union
developed activities that were to convince company managements to ”strive
for better” with a focus on higher-quality products and processes, instead of
going for the “downward spiral” which includes the increased use of fixed-
term contracts, agency work and low pay. 
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This campaign mobilised support for the idea of focusing on quality rather
than cost-competitiveness. Based on co-operation and a competition, unions
developed alternative business plans replacing the management restructur-
ing plans which mostly involved staff downsizing and outsourcing. With the
help of a network of consultants, several successful “better, not cheaper”
cases were put into practice by the unions. By doing so, jobs were saved,
working conditions enhanced and the profitability of the firm safeguarded. 
5.2 Improving the quality of atypical work
Workers’ organisations can also take initiatives to increase the quality of
atypical employment so that the workers concerned don’t join the ranks of
the working poor. Higher pay, better working conditions, improved insurance
coverage, employee-centred time flexibility and possibilities for atypical
workers to move towards a permanent and full-time job are essential here.
5.2.1 Organising atypical workers
For workers’ organisations to have a sustainable impact on the work and
wage conditions of employees, unionisation and organisation are of vital
importance. Strong unionisation provides the union with local information
and is a guarantee for policy application in the field. 
However, the working poor are less active in the unions for several reasons.
First, their limited financial capacity constitutes an obstacle to becoming a
member. Secondly, they mostly have fixed-term or part-time jobs and fre-
quently change jobs, which reduces the incentive to become involved in
union activities at the workplace. Third, they work in sectors which are tradi -
tionally difficult to organise due to their fragmented nature, frequent
agency work and the relatively small size of the companies. However,
research shows that workers with a fixed-term contract in Spain are general-
ly more critical for the economic system and are more inclined to join a
union, yet the unions do no sufficiently address theses workers (Sánchez,
2007). 
Justice for Janitors: In the US and Canada, the Service Employees
International Union (SEIU) sought to defend the rights of immigrant clean-
ers. These workers were facing low pay, anti-union strategies and easy dis-
missal as many of them had no residence permit. Moreover, putting pressure
on the direct employer
was ineffective as higher
wages and better working
conditions meant losing
the cleaning contract and
thus losing the job for
the workers. Therefore,
the SEIU developed alter-
native methods of action which were directed towards the customers of the
cleaning service: the building owners and users. Combining these strategies
with good publicity campaigns, continuing (financial and moral) support of
the union and perseverance of the workers resulted in the successful organi-
sation and improvement of the working conditions for cleaners all over the
US. Nevertheless, some resistance of local union officials who were not
enthusiastic about organising precarious, non-white workers had to be over-
come (Kloosterboer, 2007, p. 73). 
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Schoon Genoeg (“Clean enough”): For trade unions, fighting in-work pover-
ty and demanding better wage and working conditions are core activities.
But other organisations share a similar concern for the working poor.
Communication and co-operation with anti-poverty or religious organisa-
tions can enhance the impact of a campaign for minimum or decent wages.
An example from London illustrates the added value of creating connections
to the wider civil society: a
coalition of churches, mosques,
unions, schools and other asso-
ciations managed to put the
issue of a ‘living wage’ on the
political agenda, (Balazard,
2011). More specifically, for
precarious workers  with flexible
contracts, working via local
community centres, churches
and mosques is of primary importance to connect and dialogue with the
union. This is shown by a campaign of the Dutch “FNV Bondgenoten” union
which unionises workers in the cleaning sector and managed to organise a
successful strike (Heuts, 2010).
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Polish workers in the UK: A focus on a specific industry such as the cleaning
industry is fruitful, yet campaigns directed at specific parts of the labour
market also produced effective results in improving the labour conditions of
atypical workers. We here refer to the co-operation between Solidarnosc and
the British Trade Union Congress (TUC). The TUC managed to effectively
boost the working con ditions of Polish seasonal workers by attending the
job fairs where British employers hire Polish workers (Kloosterboer, 2007, p.
29). 
Italian unions for ‘atypical workers’: In Italy, special union branches were
founded which organise the atypical workers and defend their interests both
towards the employers, the government and within the union.
5.2.2 Extending collective agreements
Even if organising atypical workers is difficult, unions can improve the quali-
ty of atypical jobs by extending the coverage of collective agreements (on all
levels) to fixed-term jobs and agency workers. 
For instance, benefits of employees in a company or industry can be extend-
ed to include fixed-term and agency staff. Moreover, training opportunities
can be offered to fixed-term and agency staff so that atypical work becomes
a stepping stone rather than a dead-end street.
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5.2.3 Fight for equal treatment 
“Gleiche Arbeit - Gleiches Geld” (Equal
work - equal pay): In an attempt to
combat the abuse of temporary work in
the German metal industry, the German
metalworkers union IG  Metall launched
a campaign in 2008 under the slogan
‘equal pay for equal work’. Backed by
scientific studies, they put the topic of
temporary workers on the political as well as on the shop-floor agenda. By
2011, about 1,200 company-level agreements had been concluded improving
the conditions for agency workers in German companies. The agreements
included:
– Provisions on equal pay for agency workers;
– Limits to the use of temporary workers in the company;
– Wages paid on sick leave (Bispinck & Schulten, 2011).
At sectoral level, IG Metall managed to conclude a collective agreement in
the steel industry including provisions on equal pay for temporary workers.
Employers who do not pay the same wages to permanent staff and tempo-
rary workers can be fined to pay compensation to agency staff (Dribbusch,
2011). 
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5.3 Enabling access to decent work by providing services
Workers often accept (and even search for) atypical jobs for various social
and family reasons. Instable family life, child and elderly care obligations
and other social situations often constitute practical obstacles for employ-
ees to apply for and accept a permanent and full-time job. 
Here, workers’ organisations can play their role by:
– Pushing for the provision of sufficient and affordable child care;
– (Pushing for) the provision of social services to workers and the unem-
ployed which support and enable them to find decent jobs;
– Training of union activists so that they can play a role in solving social
problems by finding professional help for workers. Research results from
Belgium show that the provision of this kind of services is a core activity
of union activists in smaller companies. Consequently, unions should pro-
vide activists with sufficient training and support to help them do this
work (Liagre et al., 2011). 
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